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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
THE DENYER & RIO GRANDE \VESTERN
RAILROAD COMP ANY
STATEl\iENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Ewe\! & Son, Inc., hereafter called "Ewell"
brought this action in the District Court of Salt Lake
County against Salt Lake City Corporation herein
called "City", the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, herein called "D&RG" and the Union
Pacific Railroad Company, herein called "U.P." seek1

ing ( l) damages separately against each railroad for
breach of an alleged parol agreement for extra work,
( 2) damages against each railroad arising out of work
delays separately caused and ( 3) damages alternatively
against the City and D&RG for unpaid work.
DISPOSITION OF THE LO\VER COURT
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the
City and against the plaintiff, no cause of action, and in
favor of the plaintiff against D&RG in the amount of
$14,101.83 and against U.P. in the amount of $6,508.Ji
upon general verdicts returned by the jury. (R-201206, 231, 232, 237) D&RG's 1\-Iotions for Directed Verdict, for .Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, for
a New Trial and to amend the Judgment were denied.
(R-281-283).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
D&RG seeks reversal of the judgment of the
District Court, the entry of judgment in its favor against
Ewell, no cause of action, and in the alternative, reduc·
tion of the judgment against D&RG by the amount of
$4,502.00, and in the alternative for a new trial.
GENERAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Under a construction contract with the City, Ewell.
a sewer contractor, was obligated to trench sewer pipe

2

a11d protective casing in 9th South Street in Salt Lake

City through railroad crossings perpendicular to 9th

South from which the railroads had removed their
lr:ieks. (Ex. 1-P). Ewell claims that at a preconstruc1ion meeting, five days prior to his signing the contract
11 ith the City, the railroads orally agreed to pay him
C\ tra for going through the crossings in exchange for
bi:- guarantee to take no longer than ten hours per 2::!
fed of installation at each crossing. (R-469-470). The
railroads denied any such oral agreement, a type of arra 11gcment completely foreign to railroad contracting
pradiees. ( R-7 45, 702, 703, 778, 779). Furthermore,
otfiee engineer who discussed the project with
E·,1ell had no authority to contract for the D&RG and
thc D&RG always contracted by a signed writing, a fact
known to the City officials who arranged the meeting.
(ll-387, 388, 449-450, 703-704, 745).

te
1t

c·
if

:ll.
pe

D&RG owned the first three tracks encountered by
Ewell. Rather than remove and replace its main freight
line so that Ewell could trench through, D&RG agreed
by written contract to pay Ewell $125.00 a foot for tunnelling, the length thereof to be at the discretion of
the D&RG. (Ex. 38-P). D&RG ordered Ewell to
stop upon reaching 40 feet, which would be after he
had gone under the first track, but while he was still
under the next two tracks, which the railroad intended
to remove so that Ewell could begin trenching again.
I Rx. 39-P, F-725, 734-736). Ewell discovered, howerer, an unplatted 48 inch State Storm Sewer further
cJst, crossing under both the street and the h·acks at
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an angle which impeded resumption of the trenching
operation. ( R-539-540, 489, 650, 655, 65u). The storm
sewer also had to be dug around and tunnelled under
since it could not be removed and replacecl. ( H-u.51)
Rather than tranch through the remaining two D&RG
tracks under the City contract, Ewell chose to disregard
D&RG 's stop notice, and instead tunnelled under tht
remaining two D&RG tracks and the State Stor111
Sewer. a distance of 100 feet. ( R-H50, ().55, ()5()). lk
cause the State Storm Sewer was not properly platted
by the City, it paid Ewell for the last 30 feet of tunnelling. (Il--i57). D&HG, pursuant to its written contrad an<l stop notice, tendered to Ewell $;3,000.00 payment for the first 40 feet of tunnelling. (R-207-:HOI.
Liability for the middle 30 feet is denied by both
D&RG and the City. (R-65.5). Although the tunnelling
in dispute went under two D&RG tracks, it was of rn1
benefit to D&RG, which would have preferred them to
be open cut. ( R-725) . No tunnel beyond the first 40
feet would have been necessary but for the angle of
the State Storm Sewer. (R-650-651). Therefore the
additional tunnelling beyond the 40 feet contract amount
should not be borne by D&RG.
Ewell also claims that D&RG delayed the work
at its first track while deciding whether to have Ewell
tunnel under or to remove the track for Ewell to trench
through. (R-122-123, 514, 646). The bulk of the claimed
delay occurred, however, after Ewell had signed tht
written contl'act to tunnel under (Ex. 38-P) . There·
fore, D&RG denies that it delayed Ewell in any manner
4

DETAILED

OJT FACTS

On July 26, 1965 the City sent separate identical
letters to both railroads notifying them of a proposed
i11slallation of a
inch replacement sanitary sewer line
01t Htli South Streets from Richards Street to Gth 'Vest
Stred and on t>th \Vest from 9th South to Genesee
,\ wnue. (Exs. 3-P, 2-P). Enclosed with the letter
11 (re copies of the City's plan and
profile drawing
,bowing the present and proposed sewer lines, railroad
crossings, and the proposed pipe casing of a certain
dimension for the new line under the rails of each crossi11g (Ex. 22-D). The letters invited railroad approval
of the plans as they affected railroad requirements an<l
a
of railroad liability insurance requirements,
"said requirements to be included in the contractual
documents entered into by the contractor with the
City." The letter concluded:
... the contractor will be informed by the City to
use all precautions in making these crossmgs
and to notify you prior to starting work, and
crossings will be made to your requirements and
under your supervisfon. (Emphasis added.)
Both the U.P. and D&RG replied with a requirement
of
guage casing rather than 14 guage as proposed
br the City. (Exs. 11-P, 19-P). Twelve guage liner
t:asing was adopted by the City in its specifications
which went to bidders. (Ex. 1-P, pp. 2 & 3 of §1-A
therein).
On September 21, 1965, the City wrote separate
identical letters to the railroads advising that in its
5

opinion, the railroads, operating in City streets under
franchise, must "underpin and protect" their tracks
while a "utility sewer water line et cetera, is being placed
under the tracks." (Ex. 6-P, 7-P). The letters further
stated the correlative rights of its contractor and
railroads as follows:
Uncler the specifications for the above construction, we have provided for the contractor to use
all precautions in making these crossings and tn
notify you prior to starting the ·work, ({11d the
<'rnssin,'!S ,u)l he lll({dc to _1;011r requi ·c111cnts rlllrl
under your supervision. However, the City intends to open cut at these crossings, and we tdll
instruct the contractor to cooperate in ever,11 tt·111:
to make these crossings with dispatch and safetv.
and we expect the same consideration from yom
company to avoid any unnecessary delays. (Em·
phasis added.)
1

Copies of the letter went to City Commissioner Catmull
and eventually to Ewell before the bid opening. (R-903,
.534). By the term "open cut" it was understood by the
parties that the tracks would be removed by the rail·
roads so that a trenching machine could dig through.
the pipe laid and backfilled by Ewell, after which the
the tracks would be replaced by the raihoads. ( R-311312). By contrast, the term "jacking", means to push
the pipe underneath tracks which remain intact. (R
314).
After the sewer line project was opened for bid.
Ewell approached Commissioner Catmull, an experi·
enced street and sewer contractor and an acquaintance

6
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!

years, and asked him "about the costs of going
1t11dcmeath the railroad tracks." ( R-870) (Emphasis
:1dded). ''He wanted to be advised as to how he would
han· to bid this and I advised him or told him that my
alh·ice gfren to me by the city attorney's office and the
cit' engineer's office was to the effect that
extra
n:pense caused by going underneath the railroad track!>
111ntld Jia,,e to be borne by the railroads." (R-870).
1 Emphasis added). Under cross examination, Catmull
.,t:1ted that the City was asking for bids on an open cut
basis:
of'

So the city was not planning to go under. It was
planning to go through, isn't that correct?
'Vell, this is the way we were asking for bids. If
the railroad coI.11panies sent us a letter and said,
"'Ve do not desire you to open cut them but we
want this jacked under," then it would have been
jacked under, but they would have to pay the
cost. (R-877)

Catmull talked with one other bidder on the same sub.iect, (R-878). l\:Iinutes before the bid opening on
October 20, Ewell asked Catmull to announce to the
bidders assembled for the opening what Ewell had
learned privately, which Catmull did: (R-872)
I stated that the bid was being opened for city
work, this line, and that extra expense caused
from going underneath the railroad tracks, the
contractor, successful bidder, would have to make
his own arrangements with the railroad as it was
the city's contention that the railroad would have
to pay any extra expense that was caused by go-

7

ir,tg underneath the railroad. ( R-872.) ( Emphasis added.)
The announcement did not cause any bidders to withdraw or change their bids. (R-881). The abstract of
bids atttached to Exhibit 1-P shows that the City's preliminary estimate of the project was $133,291.40. Ewell
bid $119,294.40. The other three bidders were $12.5.876.70, $1.56,062.()0 and $198,198.10 respectively.
After the bid opening, the City Sewer Engineer,
Ilaro]d S. Carter, called a meeting in his office whicl1
took place on October 21, 196.5. (R-909). William D.
Keyting, City Sewer Engineer, telephoned Robert
Oatman, D&RG' s Office Engineer and requested that
he come to a meeting to discuss with the City Attorney.
city franchises concerning railroad tracks. (R-739).
Oatman in turn called S. N. Cornwall, D&RG's legid
counsel. (R-739). In addition, A. U. Miner, legal
counsel of the U.P., Myron W. Gustin, Utah Division
Engineer of the U.P., Joseph F. Fenton, Assistant
City Engineer, Homer Holmgren, City Attorney and
Carter were present. (R-357, 740). Homer Holmgren
stated the City's position that expense beyond the speci· .
fications would have to be borne by the railroads. (R358) . In practical terms, the City's position relative
to the railroads' duties ·was:
Well, we were going to bid this on open cut., If ,
we open cut, they'd have to take care of removmg ·
of their tracks, or if they wanted it tunnelled or
jacked, they'd have to take care of their tunnel·
ling or jacking. (R-421.)

8

dceision was reached and Ewell's witnesses could not
reeall the exact discussion. ( R-323- 358, 359, 421).
The D&UG neither concurred nor disagreed with the
City's position. (R-740). The U.P. disagreed with the
City. (U-800-801).
o

The next day, October 2:.?, 1965, Oatman, Gustin.
Carter, Fenton and Keyting met with Hyron Ewell in
Carter's office. (R-466, 471). Over strenuous objection
on grounds of parol evidence and that the evidence
l'omprise<l conclusions, opinion, speculation and immatcriaJ and irrelevant matter extracted by leading questions without identifying the parties speaking, Ewell
testified that the railroads orally promised to pay him
on an open cut basis $34.21 per linear foot for the inof 22 feet of casing as to each and e\•ery
track, (meaning a pair of rails) crossed by Ewell in
laying the City sewer, even though the tracks would be
previously removed and subsequently replaced by the
railroads at their own expense. (R-468, 469, 470). Since
City specifications already submitted to Ewell and
contract subsequently signed with the City,
<'alled for installation of the casing by open cut method
:1t each crossing anyway, Ewell admitted that the sole
basis for his claim for extra costs against the railroads
1rns his guarantee to cross through each area of removed
track in a maximum of ten hours, even though some
were spur tracks and even though one ten hour period
would suffice to cross through several tracks at the same
crossing. (R-466, 481, 565, 566).
9

The D&RG' s evidence was that Oatman, called
to the October 21 meeting by Keyting also attended
the October 22 meeting, (R-739, 740-741); that he
was not authorized to contract for the railroad or commit the railroad to the expenditure of funds, ( R-70:3,
7 46) ; that the Octo her 22 meeting was a preconstruetion conference to discuss the project and meet the
contractor at which the City restated its position that it
the railroads did not want to remove their tracks and
the tunnel liner or casing were instead jacked under
them, the railroads would have to bear the expense.
(R-741, 783). The question then arose as to the eml
of jacking under. (R-741, 783). The City called :t
jacking contractor and found that the cost was around
$180.00 per foot. (R-742). Oatman asked what the
City was paying Ewell per foot of pipe liner in place
using the open cut trench method, to which Ewell
replied $34.21. (R-742). The purpose of Oatman's
inquiry was that someone should pay the railroads
$34.21 per foot since if the railroads at their own expense
tunnelled underneath their tracks rather than removing
them for an open cut, the City would save $34.21 a foot
because of the absence of trenching and backfilling.
(R-7 42, 7 43, 7 44). The 22 foot figure was suggested
by the U.P. as the minimum number of feet per track
under which casing would have to be jacked without
disrupting service. ( R-783) . Gustin of U .P. asked
Ewell if he could cut through the U.P:s main line to
Provo in ten to twelve hours. (R-784, 794, 795). Ewell
said he could do it in ten. (R-784). The Assistant City

10

Engineer, Fenton, thought the ten hour figure only
applied to one track. (R-365).

X o notes, memoranda or minutes were made by

of the several persons at either of the meeting:s,
iJ:W, 805); all legal counsel present at the October n meeting where no agreement was made, (.Ewell
did not attend), failed to appear on October 2:.? when
i he alleged agreement was supposed to have been made.
1 E-d:W, 4<38). Contrary to the railroads' long estabJi:,hed practice, no written agreement or even a memor:111clt1rn was prepared, and none of the parties exagreed to anything. (R-382, 390, 437, 438, 48:!,
ilti, 7G6, 708, 795, 769, 773, 779, 797). As a result of
the October 22 meeting, Ewell claims that D&RG is
indebted to it for open cutting across four removed
tracks on the basis of 22 feet per crossing, amounting
to a total of $3,010.48. (Instruction 26).
:111\

I H-!100,

Under date of October 22, 1965 Carter wrote to
the D&RG a letter, a copy of which went to Ewell,
and the complete text of which is as follows:
The City Attorney advises me to refer you to
our letter of September 21, 1965 in regard to the
City's intent to construct a sewer line under your
tracks on 9th South Street. As stated in said
letter '"e intend to open cut, and it is your responsibility to protect your tracks to your own
sa ti sf action.

Please be advised that any tunnelling, jacking, underpinning, etc. is between you and whomever you contract with and does not involve the
11

City other than to see that our Contractor
our contract to City specifications.
Said Contractor has been notified to cooperate
fully with the railroads in the execution of this
City contract-48 hours notice, etc.
We intend to have the Contractor start construction soon and will notify you of the startincr
date. (Ex. 9-P.) (Emphasis added.)
M
No mention is made of Ewell's alleged oral agreement
with the railroads of the same date to pay extra for
open cut, as opposed to jacking.
On October 27, 1965, Ewell signed a contract with
ihe City for construction of the sewer, which obligated
the contractor to excavate, furnish and install pipe and
casing at all open cut crossings. (Ex. 1-P) . The contract had to be approved by the City Board of Commissioners. (Ex. 1-P, p. 30), and provided that all plans,
specifications and the proposal were a part of the contract and governed Ewell's performance thereunder.
(Ex. 1-P, Contract pp. 8, 12, 13 & 19, Specs. p. 1). The
proposal and contract required Ewell to examine the
construction site both before bidding and before begin·
ning work. (Ex. 1-P, Contract pp. 5, 26). Ewell
promised to perform "all the work mentioned in the
form of agreement and the specifications . . . " (Ex.
1-P,
p. 5). He agreed that the payment agreed
upon would be in full for the completed work including
stringing and laying the concrete sewer pipe and cor·
rugated iron casing liner. (Ex. 1-P, Contract pp. 10.
13, 14-27, Specs. p. 1). The contract price included
12
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I

incidental work necessary to proper completion without
extra compensation and that Ewell would be liable for
all damage to cables or other property owned by any
rorporalion other than Salt Lake City, (Ex. 1-P, Contrad pp. !l, 18). Ewell agreed that he would ··not be
c11 I it led to any claim for damage on account of hin(l r:11H.:c or delay from any cause whatever . . . " (Ex.
l P. Contrad p. HJ). \\rhere the project required the
contractor to cross existing private utilities, the specilirntions pnn·ided: ''In all of these crossings, the contractor should use extreme caution so as not to damage
Iii" interfere with any of the services ... " (Ex. 1-P,
Spees. pp.
& 3).
Ewell claims that the extra work in laying the
\ewer and casing through the open cut crossings at
per linear foot for 22 feet each, is the added
rost due to Ewell's "guarantee" to do the work in a
maximum of ten hours. (R-466, 481, 565, 566). The
' guarantee" v.-as never requested or required by the
D&RG and only complied with the City's instructions
to make the crossing with dispatch. (Ex. 6-P, R-784,
rn-!-795, 312, 365).

ender date of October 28, 1965, Carter wrote to
Ewell authorizing him to start work November 2, 1965
and stating that the contract signed by Ewell had been
approved by the Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners on October 27. Ewell was given 100 working days
to complete the contract. Although the letter shows that
vopies were forwarded to the railroads, no mention was
13

made of Ewell's alleged agreement with the railroads
or of the meetings held October 21 and October :U.
(Ex. 8-P).

As a matter of good engineering practice, .E\\e\I
started west and worked east along 9th South Stred.
( R-.J.4B) . The first tracks he encountered \\'ere three
closely laid tracks consisting of two main line track,
and a discontinued spur track belonging to D&l{(;
located at 540 'Vest 9th South Street, (Ex. 22-DJ.
The profile plan and contract specifications provided
Ly the City to Ewell called for 80 feet of Bo inch COl'ruga ted tunnel liner under these three tracks. (Es.
22-D). The corrugated casing surrounds the 24 inch
concrete sewer in order to protect it from the compression load of trains passing over it. (R-747, 7H7).
The City's contract called for Ewell to open cut all railroad crossings after the railroad removed its tracks. '
and to lay the iron casing and concrete pipe in the
trench, backfill and resurface it after which the railroad would replace its tracks. (Ex. 1-P, 3-P, 6-P).
The D&RG, however, on November 5, 1965, advised
Ewell that the casing at its western most, or the first
of these three tracks, should be jacked under the track
rather than placed by open cut so that this main freight
line would not be removed from service. (R-736).
Accordingly, D&RG prepared a written contract dated
November 5 providing that Ewell would jack 40 feet !
of the required 80 feet of corrugated metal casing for '
$5,000 which D&RG agreed to pay, making a rate
of $125.00 per foot. (Ex. 37-P). Ewell refused to sign
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ovember 5 contract. (R-757). On .Monday, No' ember 8, D&RG presented Ewell with a printed conl ract on the same form as the November .'5 cont.met
cxcepl that where 40 feet for $5,000 were previously
1ksignate<l, the following was typed in:
llic X

"Push, tunnel or jack a 36 inch diameter l::?
guage corrugated metal pipe per Salt Lake City's
for line and depth including pit
which may or may not need sheeted. Length of
casing to be determined by the Railroad's Division Engineer or his authorized
(Ex. 38-P.)
The price was $125.00 per foot. (Ex. 38-P).
1ig11ed this contract on November 8. (R-757).

.Ewell

The City's plat showed an unidentified underground
system which, upon exploration, appeared to be a storm
paralleling the three D&RG tracks on the east
:111d terminating just north of the projected sewer line.
I Ex. 22-D) . .E.well had entered one of the storm sewer's
junction boxes south of the projected sewer line prior to
bidding the job. ( R-539, 540). He had also observed
a junction box on the north side of 9th South Street
which, however, was fenced off at the time. (R-541).
, \ t this time, Ewell had assumed that the storm sewer
erossed 9th South at right angles even though the junction box on the north side of 9th South was well to the
west of the one on the South side of 9th South and
e'en though the 1-15 freeway overpass traversed 9th
South at a northwest to southeast angle. (Exs. 25-D,
-hi-P, 4-542). Ewell again explored the drain on No15

vember 5 for which reason he refused to sign the No
vember 5 D&RG contract. ( R-489, 632, 638) .

Q. I'll show you what's been marked as Exhibit
ask you if you can identify that? Now,
thats - that document entitled Contract
that's dated the 5th day of November, 1965'.
and it's unsigned.
A. That was a contract that was presented to me
by one of the other-either .Mr. Oatman or
.Mr. Kenyon to sign to put the casing under
the D&RG W tracks for a price of $5,000.00
and I ref used to sign it.

Q. 'Vhy did you refuse to sign it?
A. I had explored the job and I explained to

them it would take 90 foot of casing to gu
through there and $5,000.00 wouldn't touch
the thing, that it would have to be on a footage basis.
Q. How did you determine that it would take 90
foot of pipe?
A. I took the lid off from the cleanout box of the
storm drain, took a flashlight and a pair of
boots and to the best of my ability, tried to
measure to find out where this heavy 48 inch
storm drain was going to intersect their rai!road tracks. So, then, I go down and laid it
out on some of the ground and measured front
the west to the east to determine what length
it would take to meet the railroad requirements.
( R-488-48!l \

*****

A. No, I knew that we weren't coming in at right
angles. That's why I wouldn't sign the contract.
(R-632)

*****

16

I

Q. \Yell, hadn't you been down in that sewer on
the 5th. while you were, or appi:-0ximately the
same tune you were discussing this N ovember 5th contract with Mr. Oatman and Mr.
Kenyon?
A. No, sir. The reason that I objected to the
thing was I knew that you couldn't put 40
foot of casing in and then, tight sheet the
thing and handle the thing and get between
the railroad tracks and the storm sewer. That
it would take at least 90 feet to get us so we
could get under this storm sewer so, therefore, I wanted to explore the job. (R-638)
Ewell later decided that he determined on N ovem-

that the storm sewer angled obliquely to the
northwest across 9th South as shown on a revised profile drawing subsequently made by the City. (Ex. 25-D,

lwr 10

H-495).

Later, Ewell decided that the angle was discovered
on November 11, but he was not sure of the date. R;),54, 638). Had the State Storm Sewer crossed the 9th
South Sanitary Sewer line perpendicularly as inferred
on the City's initial plat, Ewell claims that he could
have open cut around it from both sides and there would
hm·e been no need to jack under it. (R-651, Ex. 22-D).
Because of the angle, however, as shown on Exhibit
:!6-D, it was difficult but not impossible for Ewell to
open cut between the western most D&RG track under
which he had tunnelled, and the State Storm Sewer.
(R-638, 650, 655, 656). The D&RG, however, did not
\\'ant to pay for jacking under the two additional tracks
17

to the east, the eastern most of which was a disconcontinue<l spur. Needing only to keep its main line opeii.
Oatman, on October 11 at 2 :00 p.m., ordered Ewell to
stop jacking, when he reached 40 feet, which was sufficient for the purpose. ( R-711, 725, 734, 7i31i). Sinc:t·,
under his contract with the City, it was more profitable
and quick for Ewell to jack under all three tracks and
the State Storm Sewer than to jack only under the
west D&RG track, open cut, sheet and crib through thv
two remaining tracks to the storm sewer and then dig·
around the storm sewer, Ewell continued jacking after
being ordered to stop by D&RG. (R-G36). D&HG
has neYer denied liability for payment of the 40 foot
jacking under its west track and tendered the amount
of
on a $125.00 per foot basis into court in
advance of the trial. (Ex. 40-P, R-207-210). The Cit\'
paid Ewell for 30 feet of jacking under its storm sewer.
( R-457) . What remains in dispute and unpaid is the
amount of $3,750.00 for jacking the middle 30 feet
under the two D&RG tracks which the plaintiff has
claimed alternatively against D&RG and the City. (R655, 122-123). The jury found that the City had no
responsibility for the middle 30 feet. (R-206). D&UG
claims that had the State Storm Sewer not been present
the remainder of its tracks could have been open cut
at no cost to itself other than removing and replacing
the same and that it should not have to bear the expense
of jacking necessitated by the unplatted State Storm
Sewer.
Additionally, Ewell claims that D&RG delayed
18

its operation two hours on November 8 and nine hours
on November 9 for a total of $2,341.35. (H-lii, li3).
D&HG's evidence showed that Ewell was 80 feet west
of D&UG's west track at the close of work on November
;;, ( H-7::!.J.). He spent November 9 digging up to ::!U
fed west of the tracks and widening the trench into a
pit to accommodate the men and equipment of Graven
Brothers for the jacking operation. (R-728). Ewell
denies working on November 9 and claims that the
dday was caused by D&RG' s indecision as to whether
lo jack or open cut. (R-514, 646). But Ewell's jacking
rnntraet was signed November 8, the day before the
alleged delay at which time the railroad had already
made up its mind. (Ex. 38-P, R-636). On November
10. Ewell explored around the State Storm Sewer to
determine its exact depth and line in order to be sme
that the tunnel line would be correct before commencing to jack under the tracks from the west, going east,
and on N o''ember 11 Graven commenced digging.
(H-397) Delay, if any, was caused by exploration of
the unplatted State Storm Sewer. (R-710, 397).
On November 16 and December 9, Ewell invoiced
D&RG for delays and jacking costs which on December
:!8, D&RG declined, except for $5,000.00 for 40 feet
of jacking under the first D&RG track. (Ex. 42-P,
+5-P, 40-P).
Not receiving satisfaction, Ewell enlisted the City's
help in enforcing the alleged oral agreement and in
collecting for the middle 30 feet of jacking, which
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efforts resulted in Carter's letter to D&RG of December 30. (Ex. 15-P). Mr. Carter was asked:

Q ..Mr..

came
you, di? he, and told you
of his grievance with the railroad with respeet
to certainA. I am quite sure he did. I would if I'd hare
been.

Q. On his behalf, this letter was written to the

railroad 1
A. I think that's right.
Q. And the facts that are in this letter were
given to you by .Mr. Ewell in part, were the\
not?
·
A. I suspect so. ( R-324<)
Despite Carter's lifetime practice of memorializing
meetings by letter, no memorial exists of the meeting
at which the railroads allegedly made the oral agreement with Ewell. (R.351). Carter's December 30 letter
to the D&RG attempting to reconstruct the October
22 meeting at Ewell's request is as follows:
At this meeting the City took the definite stand
that it was the obligation of the railroad to bear
the cost of ( l) placing (jacking) the 36' casing
whatever distance was necessary ( 80 feet) under
your tracks. I understand that the agreed unit
price for jacking this casing was $125.00 per
or a total of $10,000.00; and ( 2) installing via
open cut four crossings at ;22 feet each at an
agreed price of $34.21 per foot, which amounted
to $3,010.48. (Ex. 15-P.)
It is clear that the meeting Carter refers to was
October 22, not October 21 as referred to in the letter.
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!

r

and that 80 feet of jacking at four crossings was never
discussed; that no amount as to the total crossings was
dis('t1ssecl an<l that the City did not take a definite stand
:1.·; to what amount the railroads were to pay Ewell.
I

-H24) .

Carter's letter to the U.P., dated December

•

.s la lcs :

At this meeting the City took the definite stand
that it was the obligation of the railroad to support its tracks during the construction of the
City's pipeline. You agreed that 2:l would be allowed per set of tracks at a unit price to be worked out between your staff and Mr. Ewell. You
and .Mr. )liner verbally agreed to these terms.
(Ex. 14-P, emphasis added.)
Kxcept for Carter's unreliable attempt at recall, it is
11ndisputed that Mr. Miner did not attend the meeting
to which Carter refers and that there is no need to support tracks where crossing is made by open cut, they
having been previously removed. (R-338-339, 800).
According to this letter, the $34.21 unit price was not
agreed to at the meeting whereas the December 30
letter to D&RG states that it was.
On January 5, 1966, Carter again wrote to D&RG,
to memorialize a meeting on January 3 in Carter's
office attended by Oatman, Kenyon, Ewell and Holmgren pursuant to which the City admitted an obligation
to pay Ewell for the 30' of jacking under the State
Storm Sewer. (Ex. 16-P). Thereafter this action was
commenced by Ewell.
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ARGU.MENT
POINT I
THE JUDG_MENT IS ERRONEOlJS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS UNCONTlL\
DICTED THAT _i\IR. OAT.MAN HAD XElTIIEH ACTUAL NOR APPARENT ACTIIOHITY TO BIND D&RG TO THE AGREE111J£l'\T
ALLEGED BY RESPONDENT
Robert Oatman, D&RG's Office Engineer, was
the only D&RG representative attending the meeting
of October :22 at which the alleged oral contract for
extra work was made. He was personally invited t11
attend by Keyting, Assistant City Engineer. ( R-70!! 1.
A. I-I. Nance, D&RG Superintendent, testified that
in 1965 the office engineer was not authorized to c011tract on behalf of D&RG and had no authority to bind
the railroad to the expenditure of funds. (R-703-704).
Oatman was at the meeting upon the City's invitation,
not by assignment from his superiors who did have
authority to contract. ( R-739) . There is no evidence
that D&RG's Superintendent or Division Engineer
were even told by Oatman of the pending meeting. The
inference is that they were not told since Oatman testified that " [ w] e don't enter into any agreement at any
of those preconstruction meetings of any kind." (R·
747).

Contract and expenditure procedures were well
established in 1965. Even as to D&RG's Superintend-
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t'Dt, who had authority to contract for the railroad,
:iuthority for any expenditure could have been obtained
()Jllr upon written requisition submitted to Denver for
apprornl. ( R-703-704, 7-M). No requisition was sub111itted for the $34.21 rate Ewell claims and no apprornl
therefor \Vas ever secured from Denver. (R-740, 768,
lti\I). The testimony is uncontradicted that Oatman
had no actual authority to bind the the D&RG to the
( ktober 22 agreement alleged by Ewell.
Nothing Oatman said or did at the October 22
Jlil ding can bind the railroad under the principle of
apparent authority. For that, Ewell must look to Oatman 's principal, the D&RG.
The extent of an agent's apparent authority is
not measured by the extent of power exercised by
the agent; but by the principal's conduct with
reference to the power exercised by the agent ....
But the conduct of the principal must be such as
occurs prior to the deal, and not subsequent thereto. Nalia v. Giles, 114 P.2d 208, 100 U 562
(1941).
See also, Ziv Television Programs, Inc. v. Duchaine.
Hn F.Supp. 27 (D. Mass., 1961); Anheuser-Busch v.

Grovier-Starr Produce Co., 128 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.,
1942) ; Jennings v. Pittsburg Mercantile Company, 202
A.2d 51 (Pa., 1964); Perper v. Sonnabend, 221 F.2d
142 (5th Cir., 1955) ; Perigot v. Steiker, 86 A.2d 788
(N ..J., 1952); Commercial Solvents, Inc. v. Johnson,
ct al, 69 S.E.2d 716 (N.C. 1952); Franhan Distributors
v. New York World's Fair 1939, 124 F.2d 82 (2nd
Cir., 1941).
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The railroad did not send Oatman to the meeting.
( ll.7H9). There is no evidence that it knew of the meet-

ing. There is evidenee that no requisition was made
pursuant to the alleged oral agreement. ( H.7 .J.li, 7087uH). Ewell introduced no e,·idenee whereby any eonduct of the railroad should bind it to a pmportt'd agreement made by its unauthorized agent in violation of well
defined railroad procedures eontrolling the expenditun·
of funds.
Furthermore, apparent authority is founded upon
equitable estoppel. Ewell must prove an awareness 11f
conduct of the railroad whieh led him reasonably t11
believe that Oatman was authorized to contrad ornlly
to spend the railroad's money, and that he reasonabh
and in good faith relied upon such conduct to his detriment. Dohrmann Hotel Suppl,1; Co. v. Beau Bnlln me/
Inc., 103 P.2d ();'50, 99 U 188 (1940). No evideneeof
the railroad's conduct, as opposed to Oatman' s, is in tile
record.
As to Ewell's reliance even upon Oatman' s alleged
agreement, reasonable minds could not differ that it
was unreasonable. Ewell had contracted pipeline work
for 2.5 years. (R-j32). lie was astute enough to obtain
from Catmull private assurances which led to his underbidding even the City's estimate. (Ex. 1-P). He hntl
contractetl with the City and cut through railroad
tracks in streets many times. Fenton of the City had
never seen D&RG enter into an agreement such as that
alleged without a writing. (R-390). If the City had
been party to the alleged agreement, Fenton would

1
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ha •:c wanted a writing. ( R-B9:l). Based upon past
c:-.:pcrience, Ewell cannot assume a posture of naiYete
in order to claim that he reasonably relied upon any
:tj)parent authority of Oatman. Ewell's claim of reliance
11 < n dd he stronger if Oatman had asserted tha l he mh
:llltliorized to eontract, which he did not. ( R-7-t.ti ! . See
Su11fi Z'. Dcm·cr & Rio Grande IVestern Railro{/d Co.,
H:l P.:ld 921, 21 U2d 157 ( 1968). Ewell had the
l111rclcn to ascertain Oatman' s authoritv
. ' but he did
11ot ask. ( H-7.J.6). The mere fact of agency raises a
1.1 :irning to the person dealing with the agent to ascertain
the agent's authority. "One dealing with a supposed
agent is under the duty to ascertain just what his capacit)· is .. , Dohnnann Ilotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel,
Inc .. 103 P.2d, 650 99 U 188 (19.J.O). Since it was not
D&HG's practice to enter into agreements at precon·'t rtll'tion meetings, Oatman had no duty or reason to
announce his lack of authority. (R-7 47). 'Vhen Ewell
wanted to bind a party to spoken words, he knew how.
The first thing he demanded when ordered orally by
D&RG to stop jacking under the tracks at 540 West,
11 as a written notice. ( R-711). Yet as to the November
:2:2 meeting, neither he nor anyone kept any notes or
\\rote any letters of confirmation.
EYen assuming railroad conduct upon which Ewell
l'otdd haYe reasonably relied, he did not do so to his
detriment. As hereafter discussed with reference to
Point IL Ewell did not change position to his detriment since he did with reference to the project, only
ll'hat his conh·act with the City required. (R-581).

25

POINT II
THE JUDGlVIENT IS ERRONEOUS SINCE
NO CONTRACT, EITHER EXPRESS OR L\1PLIED-IN-FACT, \VAS jlADE BET\VEE:\
E\VEL;, & D&RG BECAUSE:
A. D&RG DID NOT ACCEPT EWELL'S ALLEGED OFFER AND THE lVIINDS 01"
THE PARTIES DID NOT MEET ON THE
TERlVIS THEREOF.
H. THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION
GIVEN HY EWELL FOR D&RG'S ALLEGED PROMISE TO PAY.
A. D&RG DID NOT ACCEPT EWELL'S ALLEGED OFFER AND THE MINDS OF THE
PARTIES DID NOT MEET ON THE
TERMS THEREOF:
The same requirements as to offer, acceptance,
consideration, and a meeting of the minds apply equally
to express contracts and to those implied-in-fact. They
are distinct from contracts implied-in-law, often termed '
quasi contracts, which are a legal fiction raised under
principles of estoppel to prevent one party, who has '
caused another reasonably to rely upon his conduct
from being unjustly enriched at the other's expense. ,
Corbin on Contracts §19, 102, 17 CJS Contracts S6,
Major-Blakeney Corp. v. Jenkins, 263_ P.2d 655 (Cal.
1953); Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947 (Cal.
1953). Quasi contracts do not depend for their exist!
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upon offer, acceptance, consideration and manifest
iiltd wtl understanding and recovery is measured bv
rt stitution of the unjust enrichment.
.
t·11cc

The evidence is disputed that Ewell e,·ei1 made
:111 offer. The railroads' evidence is that Gustin asked
Ev,ell if he could get through the U.P. Provo main
!Ille in ten hours. Oatman asked what Ewell was getl;;1g paid by the City for installation of metal liner
open cut. Ewell testified that he guaranteed getting
tlirnugh each track in ten hours. The railroads never
asked for a guarantee. They knew by the City's letter
of September 21 that the contractor would be instructed
to cross the tracks with dispatch, meaning as rapidly
a.s possible, so that the railroads would not be delayed.
I H-:n2, 433, 434). The City's witnesses were vague
as to the exact conversation. Accordingly, there was no
testimony that Ewell made an offer.
Ewell admits that he did not ask the railroads to
pay the alleged price, that they never said they would
the quoted price and that he never talked to the
railroads as to whether or not they were going to pay
him for laying the sewer pipe. (R-481-482, 603). Ewell
admitted that D&RG never agreed to pay him. (R.)()J) . 'There was therefore no express contract as to
extra payment for open cut crossings. Respondent's
e,·idence from himself and three witnesses employed by
the City as to formation of the alleged contract, with
objections and rulings deleted, is as follows:

Carter, the Salt Lake City Engineer, testified:
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Q. pid
people say anything acceptmg this figure of $34.21 per foot?
A. As I recall they didn't object but I don't think
they said anything. (R-914.)

*****

A. Well, I heard the figure $34.21 and as the
price per foot for open cut and all present
understood it and none asked what did you
say or anything like that.
·

Q. Was there any objection to that?
A. No objection I heard of.
Q. Did the railroads say they would not p<ly
that?
A. No.

* * * * *

(R-!Jl8)

Q. (By Mr. Martineau) Did they say they were
not responsible for that charge; did any railroad represent it?
A. Not that I recall. (R-918)

Fenton, testified that the $34.21 issue arose in the

field after the October 22 meeting and that the ten hours
maximum related only to the D&RG track at 540 West
9th South where the State Storm Sewer was discovered.
(R-365-376):
A. The question was asked Mr. Ewell as to h_ow
soon, how fast he would make the crossmµ:
and different amounts of time were discussed
and, as I recall, he agreed that he .would make
the crossing in ten hours and less if he would
do this.

Q. Now, was that at each crossing?
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A. As I

it was the specific crossing where
the pipe and the box were found. I don't re(R-365)
call it being at each crossing.

Q.

* * * * *

Now did-at this meeting, after this
price
by Mr_. Ewell, did any repeither railroad make any ob.Ject10n to this price?

A. No.

Q. Did any representative of either railroad sav
this was not their responsibility?

·

A. No.
Q. Did any representative of either railroad say
they wonldn·t par this price?
(R-3fHi)
A. No.

* * * * *

Q. Or that they wouldn't pay this price?
A. No.
Q. Now, was there any discussion about-was
there any discussion on the part of any representative of either railroad that this price
wasn't acceptable to them?
A. I don't recall anyone making that statement.
(R-366.)

/{ eytinr;, testified that when the parties left the
October 22 meeting he had a general feeling that they
either had an understanding or would soon have one.
(R-437).

Q. Now, did-did the railroad representatives
make any reply to that price that he quoted
them.
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A. I don't believe so. I can't remember just exact
discussion.
·

Q. You remember any discussion about
A. Not very much.
Now, was this price quoted to them at the
first of the meeting or toward the end of the
meeting?
A. \Vell, I believe there was some discussion
first. It was probably in the middle or the end.
Q. Of the meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. Did any representative or either railroa<l oh·
j ect to that price?
A. No, sir.

*****

( R--t:n I

Q. (By .Mr. Martineau) Did any representative
of either railroad say they wouldn't pay this
price?
A. No, sir.

Q. That this was not their responsibility?

A. No, sir. (R-428.)
Ewell admitted that no one from the
'

ever agreed to pay the $34.21 rate, (R-564).
Q. Okay. Now, at the meeting when you quote(dl
from this price of $34.21, was this discusse
then by the railroad people?

A. Yes.
Q. And what was said by whom?
A. I think both of the railroad people, Mr. Gns-
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tin and
Oatman, it was discussed with
them about the amount of time and they set
the time limit for them, or wanted to se.t the
time limit to eight hours, and I refused to
accept this $3-1.21 on the basis of eight-hour
time limit. But I would-did tell them I
would do it on a ten-hour time limit.

Q. And what did they say to that?
A. There was a general discussion among them
and I'm not sure what their commitment was.
Ther did discuss the jacking method with
Armco and the prices he got were too much
money.
Q. Rut that was before you gave them this price?

A. That's right. Yes, sir.
Q. So, now, did they ever object to this price?

A. No, sir.
Q. Did they ever say they wouldn't pay this
price?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did they ever say they weren't responsible for
payment of this charge?

A. No, sir.

*****

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. KETTNER:
Q. Did you ask them to pay the price?

A. I didn't ask them to pay the price. They asked
me for the price, which I presented to them.
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Q. I see. In other words, you never made any demand that you [they] pay this price at all 1
A. Not at that meeting.

DIREC1' EXAMINA1'10N
(CONTINUING)
BY MR. 1lfAR1'INEAU:
Q. Now, did they say that they would pay this
price?

A. No, I don't recall that they did say that ther
would pay the price, and I wasn't concerne;I
because everyone was satisfied with the prices
that I presented to them at that meeting. (R-J.80-482.)

It is evident that no express assent was ever given b)'
either of the raihoads. Additionally, the ten hour guarantee upon which Ewell's entire case rests was raised
by the U.P. and was of no interest to the D&RG, which
hired Ewell to tunnel under its main line.

Nor will any implied assent to Ewell's offer be
found from the evidence. Over objection and without
foundation, Ewell's case for implied-in-fact contract
rests upon the failure of D&RG to object to the figures
which "came up" at the October 22 meeting. (R-913).
Ewell admits that he did not talk to the railroads about
rayment until he "got in trouble on this." (R-603).
Ewell's claim depends upon the formation of a
bilateral contract whether express or implied. Ewell
proposed to cross in less than ten hours if the railroads
would pay. This required acceptance of Ewell's pro-
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posal by a promise to pay. D&RG made no promise. In
H . .!. Daum Construction Company v. Child, 247 P.2d
122 U 194 (1952), this Court held:
If appellant unconditionally accepted respondents' offer before it was withdrawn, there was a
binding contract. Such an acceptance requires
manifestation of unconditional agreement to all
of the terms of the off er and an intention to be
bound thereby. Such manifestation may be
either written or oral or by actions and conduct or
a combination thereof, but regardless of the form
or means used, there must be made manifest a
clef inite intention to accept the offer and every
part thereof and be presently bound thereby without material reservations or conditions.

*****

Acceptance must be unequivocal m order to
create a contract.
Nor did Ewell's subjective understanding compel
the formation of an agreement:
It is fundamental that every contract requires
mutual assent or consent. ... The determination
whether it is present is made by the use of an objective test, the manifestations or expressions of
assent being controlling. . . . Mutual assent is
gathered from the reasonable meaning of
words and acts of the parties, and not from their
unexpressed intentions or understanding. . . .
Acceptance of an offer, which may be manifested
by conduct as well as by words, must be expressed
communicated by the offeree to the offeror.
Russell v. Union Oil Company, 86 Cal Rptr.
424 (1970).
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An even more serious defect to Respondent's claim
is the undisputed evidence that the minds of the
never met on Ewell's terms. Oatman's recollectiou oJ'
the discussion at the October 22 meeting is as follo\\

(,.J. Now, the-do you recall any particular conversation that transpired at this second meeting?

A. vVell, yes ..Mr.-1 think-remember it stated
their position, but they had a project invoh-ing a City sewer line, which would cross railroad tracks, and, of course, their contract with
the contractor covered the open cut method
that is trenched right across where these
tracks were supposedly to be removed.
Q. And what else was dis.cussed at this

A. Well, he also stated the City's position again
that probably if any of-if any other method
was to be undertaken so far as jacking or tunnelling, this would have to be done by the railroad at railroad expense, and from this, the
question arose, well, what does it cost to jack
a piece of pipe.
Q. Under tracks?

A. Under a railroad track. Well, no one knew
what it cost, so it was suggested that I think
Mr. Keyting call a contractor or two contractors and try to determine what this cost
might be. Mr. Ewell didn't know. He didn't
do this type of work, jacking under railroad
tracks. So, then, the question arose well, if we
jack a piece of pipe under the railroad track.
I'm sure this contract-this party that I call
will want to know how many feet we're talk34

ing about because, just like anything volumes
reduces the price per foot and
Gustin
made the statement that if any tracks were to
be jacked or tunneled under to keep temporary service a minimum length of 22 feet
would be necessary on a temporary basis per
track.
That would be jacking under?
A. That would be jacking under the track.
Q. I see.

A. And, then, as I remember, I think it was lHr.
Keyting that called Armco for some price of
$180.00 or some pretty high figure, after
which I raised the question concerning what
the City was reimbursing Mr. Ewell per foot
of tunnel liner in place per the open cut method. And the reply that I got from Mr. Ewell
was that it was in excess of $30.00.
Now, apparently, it must be just $34.21. This
figure there was a direct answer to my question concerning what he was being reimbursed
by the City under their contract by the open
cut method.
Q. Now, did you have some reason for asking
him what he was being paid by the City for
laying this pipe in there?
A. 'Vell, absolutely. The contract with the City
covered the trenching of the ground, the excation and the material existing removal of same
by trucks and the replacement of excavation.
There was some bedding involved under the
pipe backfill, road base and so forth. So, it
appeared to me in my own thoughts that if
we were going to eliminate or the excavation
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possibly and the backfill for whatever we
decided, if we decided to jack under am
track, there should be some reimbursement
from someone to the railroad company or
railroad companies if they elected to jack or
tunnel a piece of pipe under the railroad
track, there should be a decrease in whatever
amount we'd have to pay for whoever this
contractor might be to jack or tunnel a piece
of pipe.
* * * * *
Q. (By 1.\'Ir. Burton) My question was, what
was this deduction to represent in terms of
work done? In other words, you've told us, I
believe, that you asked Mr. Ewell to give you
a price of what he was being paid to put this
pipe in place by the City and in the open cut
method. Then, you thought - you thought
it was, too, that there'd be a deduction from
the jacking price?

1

A. 'Vell, the cost of the excavation price being
paid for by the City, the backfill cost being ·
paid for by the City. In other words, we knew ,
that if we determine to jack or tunnel under
any track that there'd be some cost invoked.
'Ve didn't know what it was. This $180.00
was somewhat of a high figure. We don't
know, well, this would be the final figure or
what, but whatever this figure might, it could ·
be reduced to some extent, which would be 1
excavation, backfill, bedding, road base.
minus the tunnel liner itself from the-whatever price we finally determined.

Q. Now, this deduction you've told us about. did
this get talked about in that meeting, or w:.h
it ever raised?
A. This was - no, this was never discussed in
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the .meeting. This was my own thought for
askmg a question in the beginning. (R-741745).

:\lyron Gustin of the U.P. remembered the discussion
likewise:
(-J_. I want you to give me your best impression

of what happened at this meeting, as you
remember.

A. As I remember, the subject came up as to
how or what was the best method of crossing
under tracks, either by the open cut or by
jacking or supporting the tracks and we started talking about that if we jacked under the
track we would come to more or less a 22 foot
length of casing pipes that we thought would
be-would protect the tracks and leave them
in operation. And Mr. Ewell, as I recall,
was asked that this would-what this would
cost. Well, he was unable to tell us and, then,
lVIr. Keyting, the City Sewer Engineer, suggested that we call some companies that were
engaged in this type of business and two calls
were made and the cost of jacking, the prices
that we received for the jacking this casing
pipe through were so exhorbitant, we said,
well, that's out. We' re not going to do anything like that, and I said at that time that
inasmuch as we were going to the open cut
method and that was agreeable with the Union
Pacific there was no use for me staying any
further. So, I got up and left.
Q. Do you remember any discussion
to
the amount of time that l\'Ir.Ewell might
have to cross tracks?
A. Yes. Yes. Yes.
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\\'ould you relate what that di-, :11,sion \l:t\'
1

A. I had previously discussed this matter 11 iti1
our Superintendent, Mr. Larkin, and he wa,
agreeable to open cutting all of our track.I
and the only one that he ha<l any apprehe11
sion about was our Provo _Main. and he a\ked
me if I would ask Mr. Ewell if he could cut
through that in ten to twelve hours, and 1
know at the very start of the meeting, I asked
l\ir. Ewell if he could cut through our Pnm1
lVIain, which was the eastern-most track on
3rd 'Vest of the Union Pacific in ten to twelrl'
hours, and he says, well I can do it in te11.
'Vell, then, I jokingly said, 'Vell, can
do it in eight and he said, oh, no. No, ten
hours.
(H-78:3-78-J.i

* * * * *

Q. Now, do you remember the figure $:34.21
coming up?
A. No, sir.
Q. You don't even remember that figure?
A. No, sir.
(R-785)

* * * * *

(By
Burton)
Q. l\1r. Gustin, you testified, I believe, that th 1:
first of these two meetings on October 21st,
l\ir. Holmgren read some sort of an ordinance or franchise, was it?

A. Yes.
Q. llut you don't know whether
had anything to do with this street or either of the
railroads?
A. No, sir.
Q. It may have been just some sort of example,
as far as you know?
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A. That's right.
was no agreement as to whose respons1b1hty was what at that meeting, I take
A. They brought out - the City Attorney
brought out the fact that any bridging or
piling or for support of the tracks would be
done at our expense.

That was the City's position?
A. Yes.
I see. Now, the connection with the ten hour
limitation, it was you that raised that question, as a understand your testimony?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And thta had reference only to one Union
Pacific track?

A. Yes, sir.
There's no discussion about a time limitation
on any other Union Pacific track or any
D&RG track?
A. No, sir.
Q. Now, in a question of open cutting a railroad
track, the rails are removed. That's correct,
isn't it?

A. That's right.
Q. And the railroads don't anticipate it, then, I
take it, that there should be any added exrails are
pense to going through after
removed, do they?

A. None whatsoever.
Q. Now, this second meeting, October 22nd, I
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take it from what you've said, there was nu
agreement of any kind at this meeting, that
you are a ware of?
A. No sir. No, sir.

Q. As a matter of fact, you could say with some
positivity, I take it, that there was no agreement of any kind to pay any money?
A. There was no agreement on my part whatsoever to pay any money to the contractor

Q. And you don't know of any agreement hy
anybody to pay any money, do you?

A. No, sir. No, sir.

Q. There was,

I take, also, no discussion at
this meeting about charging anything extrn
to the railroads for the purpose of open cutting or going through where the rails had
been removed?

A. That's right.

Q. No discussion at all?

A. No.
Q. Now, if there had been some claim that the
railroads should pay the contractor for going
through a place where the rails had been re·
moved, what would the Union Pacifi's response to that have been?
A. '"Tell, right away, there would be an argument.

Q. \i\Thy?

A. Because the specifications called for the open
cuttina and once we removed the track, what
extra
is there? He would be doing the
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same thing he'd been doing on either side
of the track. So, there'd be no additional cost
to the railroad. ( R-794-796).

The law of Utah is that the minds of the parties must
meet on the same terms:
\Ve think he failed to show such a meeting of
minds between plaintiff's agent and defendant's
agent on the terms of the proposed lease as to
constitute a contract.
In order that there may be an agreement, the
parties must have a distinct intention common
to both and without doubt or difference. Until
all understand alike, there can be no assent, and,
therefore no contract. Both parties must assent
to the same thing in the same sense, and their
minds must meet as to all the terms. E. B. Wicks
Co. v. Mo;t1le, 137 P.2d, 342, 103 U 554 ( 1943).
On facts similar to the case at bar, see E. Levy and ComJHlll:iJ v. Shreveport Plumbing Company, 108 So.2d, 810
La. 1959) . The requirement that the parties actually
agree is not lessened by calling the contract implied:

A condition precedent to the enforcement of
any contract is that there be a meeting of the
minds of the parties, which must be spelled out,
either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient
definiteness to be enforced. V alcarce v. Bitters.
364 P.2d, 427, 12 U.2d, 61 ( 1961).
Furthermore, Ewell cannot use D&RGW's silence
in order to fabricate the requisite assent. "Generally
speaking, an offeree need make no reply to offers, and
his silence and inaction cannot be construed as an assent
to the offer." 1 Williston on Contracts §91. "An offeree
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has a right to make no reply to offers, and hence that hi.,
silence is not construed as acceptance." 1'rusrnn Steel
Company v. Cooke, 98 F.2d, 905 (10th Cir.
Nu
facts appear in the record raising a duty on the part of
D&RG to object even to Respondent's Yersion of tlie
"proposal." Nor is any case made for assent by estoppel
since there was no duty to speak on the part of D&HG.
Since Ewell admitted doing no more at the crossings
than was required by his contract with the City, then·
was no change of position on his part.
word "feet" on line three should have been transcribed
" no t" . )
B. THERE 'VAS NO CONSIDERATION GlY
EN BY E'VELL FOR D&RG'S ALLEGED
PROMISE TO PAY:
Ewell claims that his "guarantee" to cross each railroad track in a maximum of ten hours was proffered in
exchange for D&RG's silent promise to pay $34.21 per
22 feet at each track. In a bilateral contract, considera·
tion is defined as a detriment to the promisor or a bene·
fit to the promisee. 1 'Villiston on Contracts §103. Since
Ewell by his own admission did exactly as obligated un·
der his contract with the City, he has suffered no detri·
ment. (R-581.)
On the other hand, there is no evidence that cross·
ing the tracks in ten hours benefited D&RG. To the
contrary, D&RG tracks included a discontinued spur.
Only one track, the main line tunnelled under, was of
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<'oncern to it. The ten hour limit without which no $34.21
11ould have been charged, was suggested by Ewell in
to U.P.'s request of how long it would take
gwell to open cut its main line track. (R-466, 469, 566,
.1-H-.548.) Ewell claims he wanted ten hours per track
to assure himself adequate security:
And they wanted ten hours per track?
A. I wanted ten hours per track for my crossing.
(R-469)

* * * * *

Q. So you wanted ten hours?

A. I wanted ten hours for the security of having
time enough to do the job, yes, sir.
Q. You wanted ample time to be sure you got

through there?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. So you asked for ten hours?
A. I told him that I would guarantee to gc
through them in ten hours.
Q. That was, guarantee was your estimate,
wasn't it?

A. That was his idea.
Q. You just told me you told-

A. He asked me if I would be sure if I could
I
es,
go th;ough that in ten
sir. I 11 guarantee that I will. He said, Can
you do it in eight?" I said, "No, sir."

'::V

(R-567)
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The eYidence shows that .Ewell cut through all trae\; 1
in less than ten hours each and in some cases througJ
several at a time. (R-477, 614.) Ewell prm·i<le<l uo penalty for failure to meet his guarantee. ( H-.'57:3.) Fmthermore, the 5,000 feet of project were <lone in (iO day.1,
rather than the 100 allotted clays. ( R-57H.) Th<.: us11al
aYerag·e was seyeral hundred feet IJer day• ' meanino·
one
C'I
8 hour shift, or 25 feet per hour. (R-57;'5-57().) On a
good day he would do 400 feet, or 50 feet an hour. (H;')7(5.) Ile trenched B55 feet, including the C. P. erossing at 1st \Vest in one clay and the two D&RG tracks at
4th \Vest in one day. (R-579, 614.) Yet under hi,
"guarantee" a mere 22 feet was cushioned with a ten
hour maximum, eyen when the 22 feet of crossings onrla pped. The $34.21 price was intended by Ewell a.1
douhle payment (paid onee by the City and once by the
railroads) based upon Ewell's estimate that getting
through the crossings would slow his rate to one-halt'
production. ( R-565, 543.) The metal liner installed
under the tracks was solely for the protection of tile
City's sewer and was not to support the tracks. (R-7J7.
797.)
1

"\Vhen a party under a contractural duty to don
certain act performs it under an agreement that it shall
he the consideration for the promise of a third person.
he incurs no legal detriment since he was previous!)·
bound to perform that very act," 1 \Villiston on Contracts
Therefore, there is no consideration fm
D&RG-' s alleged promise to pay extra for the same work.
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"The great weight of authority is opposed to the rnlidity of such agreements." I Willison on Contrads
Finally, since Oatman was not authoriz;ed to hind
the
clearly Gustin of the U.P. was not so authori;:ed and Ewell could not reasonably have believed him
t() be. Yd :Ewell's proof fails to distinguish between the
r:i ilroads as to statements made and "agreements" reachPcl at the October :22 meeting. All that Respondent introd11ecd was an "understanding" or an "assumption"
that an agreement had or would soon be reached on
terms a.-.; to whid1 not even Respondent's witnesses coul'llrred. In summary, the evidence is undisputed that
]),\:HC never either expressly or impliedly assented to
E"ell's offer, that the minds of the parties never met on
the same terms, and even if they did, that the agreement
is unenforceable for lack of consideration and definitencss.
POINT III

THE

IS ERRONEOUS BECr\ CSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE GIVING
HISE TO
CONTRACT, lVHICH IS IN
1\XY EYENT BARRED
As with the principle of apparent authority, Ewell
did not change position to his detriment in reasonable
l'e]iance upon the alleged oral agreement of October 22.
Additionally, the labor and materials furnished by Ewell
haYe not unjustly enriched D&RG. The pipe and liner
installed in place underneath the railroad tracks are
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items of contract specification. (Ex. 1-P.) The tuund
liner protects the pipe not the tracks. (R-747, 797.) All
that the City asked D&RG to do was remove its traeks
or to pay for tunnelling under them if it did not wish t11
remove them. Ewell was obligated under its contract and
instructions to do the work with dispatch and without
interferring with the railroad. The ten hour guarantee,
whether applicable to all tracks or one, was for the benpfit of Ewell. Even if of incidental benefit to the railroad, no quasi contractural obligation thereby arose.
The mere fact that a person benefits another
is not of itself sufficient to require the other to
make restitution therefore .... Nor are services
performed by the plaintiff for his own advantage, and from which the defendant benetits incidentally, recoverable. Baugh v. Darle;y, 18J
P.2d 335, 112 U 1 (1947).
Ewell testified that he charged the railroad the same
as his unit reimbursement price under the City contract.
the total amounting to double payment on the basis ol
one-half production at the open cut crossings. (R-.565,
.543.) $34.21 per foot for 22 feet is the alleged contract
amount. It is the amount contained in Instruction No.
2u. There was no proper instruction submitted to the
jury on restitution, or quantum meruit, the measures of
recoyery under quasi contract. Nor was there any e1·idence either of the value of any unjust enrichment
ferred on D&RG because of the ten hours "guarantee
or of the reasonable value of Eweffs added labor. The
$34.21 unit price in the City's contract comprehends payment for material. It is, therefore, improper on a restitn·
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I ion basis for Ewell to have the benefit of a double
amount charged for material and labor to the railroad
where he has alleged increased labor only. Also, Ewell
uwde much better than one-half time going through the
open cut crossings.

Hespondent's suit for restitution in quasi contract
j·, repugnant to its suit for breach of contract and cannot
be maintained. Where the latter depends upon proof of
:m actual contract, whether express or implied, the former is a legal fiction in the absence of contract, requiring
rest it11tion on the basis of unjust enrichment or a quanl un1 meriut recovery based upon benefit conferred. Dallu11 1·. American Ammonia Co., 127 NE 502 (l\:lass
1!120)
v Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 253 P.169, 69
l Hil ( 1927) .
T.

POINT IV
TUE
APPEALED FROl\I IS
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE RESPONDENT'S
RIGHTS AGAINST D&RG ARE CO:MPREHENDED AND DETERMINED BY EWELL'S
CONTRACT \VITH THE CITY AS TO WHICH
D&RG IS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
D&RG was notified by the City of the proposed
sewer replacement months before Ewell became the
contractor. (Ex. 3-P, 6-P.) The City sought D&RG's
approval as to the proposed work's effect on D&RG
tracks and so f umished plans and specifications for the
railroad's review. D&RG and U.P.'s requirement that
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the liner be reduced to 12 gauge from U gauge 11a.1
adopted by the City and included in the specification,
The contractor was instructed to
with the railroad, open cut the crossings with dispatch and that said
crossings would be under the supervision of the railroad 1.
(Exs. 6-P, 9-P.)
The contract between the plaintiff and City, dater]
October 27, 1965, was entered into Subsequent to plaintiffs alleged oral agreement with D&RG on October
1965. The ,nitten contract had to be approved by the
City Board of Commissioners (Ex. 1-P, Contract p. :JO 1
and prm·ided that all plans, specifications and the proposal were a part of the contract and governed plai11tiffs performance thereunder. (Ex. 1-P, Contract pp.
8. 12, 13 & 19-Specs. p. 1.) Plaintiff was required
thereunder to examine the construction site both before
bidding and before beginning work:
The undersigned hereby declares, as bidder.
that he has personally examined the site of the
herein proposed work.
. (Ex. 1-P. Contract
p. 5)

* * * * *

The contractor bidding on this work shall make
a thorough examination of the conditions at the
site of the work and of access to the site so that
he will understand the problems im·oked o!
carryinoon the work herein provided ... (Ex.
.
1-P. Contract p. 26)
The contract contemplated full payment for the com·
pleted project as therein described:
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The undersigned hereby declares . . that if
his bid . . . is accepted, he will contract . . . to
perform all the worl.: mentioned in the form of
ayreement and the specifications . . . and that
he will accept in full payment there/ ore the prices
mnned in the attached .<rchedule. Said prices are
to include and cover the furnishing of all material, labor, tools, equipment and all other things
necessary to complete the entire work in a proper
and 'rnrkmanlike manner according to the Plans.
Profiles and Details of the City Engineer, and
upon the terms and conditions and in the manner
set forth in the Specifications and the form of
Contract, ... to the full satisfaction and accepta nee of the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City. (Ex. 1-P, Contract p. 5) (emphasis added)

* * * * *

SCOPE OF THE \YORK. The work embraced in and to be done under this contract
consists of the furnishing of all necessary materials, labor, tools, appliances and equipment
necessary for, or appurtenant to the construction
and satisfactory completion of all the work
herein specified, in accordance with the plans,
specifications, profiles, cross sections and other
drawings on file in the Office of the City Engineer, and as further detailed in Section 2 of the
specifications. (Ex. 1-P, Contract p. 7)

* * * * *

Payment at the unit prices agreed upon will
be in full for the completed work and will cover
all materials, supplies. labor, tools, machinery
and all other expenditll!"es incident to a complete
and satisfactory compliance with the contract.
(Ex. 1-P, Contract p. IO)

* * * * *
-t9

\i\TITNESSETH: That the sai<l Contraetul'
. . . in accordance with the proposal therefore.
which is bound herewith, . . . hereby eo\·enaut1
and agrees to and with the City to undertake and
execute all of the said named work, ... anJ (11
furnish all materials and all tools, eq uiprneni
and labor necessary to properly perform and
complete the work, ready for use, in strict acwith the attached specific:.i tions an<l the
detail drawings, plans and profiles mentioned
therein ... and to accept as full compensation
therefore the unit prices or lump sum as bid and
named in the proposal attached hereto and made
a part hereof. (Ex. 1-P, Contract p. 13)

* * * * *

\¥HAT THE CONTRACT PRICE IX·
CLUDES - The prices named in the proposal
attached hereto are for the completed work, and
include the furnishing of all the materials, and
all labor, tools, equipment and appliances, and
all expense, direct or indirect, connected with
the proper execution of work, in accordance with
the plans, profiles, details and specifications for
the work, ... (Ex. 1-P, Contract p. 14)

* * * * *

The contractor shall furnish ... all labor, ma·
terials, equipment, tools, supervision, etc., and
all costs involved, necessary to the final compJe.
tion of the work required under this contract, n.i
specified, ... (Ex. 1-P, Contract p. 27)

* * * * *

The work required under this contract shall
consist of the following: The excavation of the
pipe trench and other required incidental. exca·
vation as shown on the drawings or as directed
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by the .Engineer; the furnishing, handling, hauling, stringing and laying of 10'', 18" and 24"
inside diameter concrete pipe, and 30" and 36"
ir?n pipe; the furnishing and placing
of pipe beddmg gravel in the trench; the furnishing and setting or pouring of concrete sewer
manholes, complete with cast iron covers and
frames ; making the necessary connection from
existing lines to new lines; the breaking out, remoya J and disposal of asphalt roadway and concrete pavement over the trench section; and the
replacement of all asphalt and concrete so removed together with properly prepared bases as
required. All said work is hereinafter specified
or shown on the prepared drawings. (Ex. 1-P,
Spec. p. l)
Plaintiff's claim for damages caused by alleged unreadelay on the part of D&RG is barred by the
eontract:
CLAIM FOR DAMAGE - The contractor
shall not be entitled to any claim for damage
on account of hindrance or delay from any cause
whatever, ... (Ex. 1-P, Contract p. 19)

* * * * *

If, for any reason whatsoever, the work is closed
down temporarily, then the contractor shall clean
up all of the finished work provided in above
Paragraph 12, and all other work under construction shall be cleaned up, material on hand
shall be properly stored and made safe from
damage or loss and to the satisfaction of the engineer : (Ex. 1-P, Contract p. 20)

* * * * *
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In this construction operation it will Le ncces
sary to cross over or under existing private and
public overhead and underground utility
such a.s gas, water, sewer, power and telephone
cables, service laterals, etc. In all of these crossings, the contractor should use e.:vtremc cautiu 11
so as not to damage or interfere with any of the
sernices. . . . Proper location of all facilities
shall be determined prior to any digging operation. . . All costs involved to repair or replace
such damage done shall be borne by the contractor and the City assumes no responsibility. (E\.
1-P, Spec. pp. 2 & 3, emphasis added)
The extra work ellegedly performed by plaintiff in
laying the sewer under the respective railroad tracks at
$34.21 per linear foot is proportedly the cost of installing ·
:22 feet of corrugated metal pipe at each crossing to protect the concrete sewer pipe from load occasioned by the
tracks above. These items are specifically enumerated in
the specifications:
The work required under this contract shall '
consist of the following: . . . 30" and 36" cor
rugated iron pipe; ... (Ex. 1-P, Spec. p. 1)

* * * * *

Furnish and lay 30" 12 gauge corrugated metal
pipe complete, including
bolts, etc.
Eighty-six Lin ft. at $12.90 per Lm ft. $1,109.40.
(Ex. 1-P, Bid Item No. 10)

* * * * *

Furnish and lay 36" 12 gauge corrugated
pipe complete, including bands, bolts, etc. Fn:e
Hundred Sixty-One Lin ft. at $15.37 per Lin
ft. $8,622.51. (Ex. 1-P, Bid Item No. 11)
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The aforesaid contract provisions recogni'.led the
City's duty not to interfere, disturb or damage railroad
property in a City street. By contracting with the City
as aforesaid, Ewell undertook, as agent, to discharge the
City's contractural duty to D&RG, a third party creditor
beneficiary. In exchange, D&RG removed and replaced
its tracks to accommodate the City's project as pel"formed by Ewell.
ln 11'1. II. Walker Realty Co. v. American Suret,t;
Cu .. 211 P. 998, 61 U.222 ( 1922), a building owner
l1rought suit to enforce a contract and indemnity bond
t:-.ccute<l by the general contractor and subcontractor
for the installation of an elevator system in the building.
The elevators proved defective and the Court permitted
lhe suit under the rule that "wherever it appears from a
contract that there is a clear intent to benefit a third
party, whether specifically named in the contract or not,
s11d1 person, ordinarily may sue in his own name for enforcement thereof or for the benefits arising therefrom."

The question therefore is, "That was the intention of the parties to the eleva tor contract and
the bond when they subscribed their signatures
thereto? Defendant contends that the building
company alone had a right of action because it
was the only party with whom the defendant contracted. But this does not determine the question. The vital question is, was it within the contemplation of the parties to the contract that
plaintiff had an interest in its performance, and
was to be a beneficiary thereof?
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In view of the correspondence seeking railroad ap
proval of the crossings and the City's written instructious
to Ewell to make the crossings with dispatch and un<ler
railroad supervision, it was clearly within the contemplation of Ewell and the City that D&RG had an interest
in performance of the October 27 contract and was to he
a beneficiary thereof. That contract was signed five Jays
after the October 22 meeting and following correspondence from the City to the railroads, copies of which went
to Ewell. D&RG is not seeking compensation for the expense of removing and replacing its tracks, but it doe1
want the protections afforded by the contract terms intended for its benefit. See also Continental Banh'
Trust Company v. Stewart, 291 P.2d 890, 4 U.2d 2t8 '
( 1955). In Oman Construction Co. v. Tennessee Centro/
lly. Co., 370 SW2d 563 (Tenn 1963), a contractor entered into a contract with a municipality to construct a
sewer passing beneath a railroad's freight depot. The
plaintiff railroad enforced its damage claim against the ,
contractor on the principle of third party beneficiary as
applied to the terms of the construction contract with the
City. See also Lundt v. Parsons Construction Co., 150
N'V2d 108 (Neb 1967); Bator v. Ford Motor Corp.,
:?57 N'V 906 (Mich 1934); Louisville Gas
Electric
Corp. v.
and Co., 63 S'V2d 1036 (Ky 1933):
Keefer v. Lombardi, 102 A2d 695 (Penn 1954), and
Baker v. S. A. Healy Co., 24 NE2d 228 (Ill 1939).

1
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POINT V
THE JUDG:\IENT APPEALED
lS
EHRONEOUS BECAUSE RESPONDENT IS
ESTOPPED BY CONTRACT AND EQUITY
TO CHARGE D&RG FOR DELAY AND EXTHA COSTS
Ewell's contract with the City as to which D&RG
is a third party beneficiary provides:
The _contractor shall not be entitled to any claim
for damage on account of hindrance or delay
from any cause whatever. (Ex. 1-P, Contract
p. 19, emphasis added).

* * * * *

\VHAT THE CONTRACT PRICE INCLUDES - The prices named in the proposal
attached hereto are for the completed work, and
include the furnishing of all the materials, and
all labor, tools, equipment and appliances, and
all expense, direct or indirect, connected with
the proper execution of work, in accordance with
the plans, profiles, details and specifications for
the work, ... (Ex. 1-P, Contract p. 14)
In Treakle v. Pocahontas Steamship Company, 406
F.2cl, 412 (4th Cir. 1969), tugboat pilots employed by a
towing corporation claimed compensation from the owners of ocean-going vessels which they docked. The court
found that the contract between the pilots' employers
and their union fixed compensation for docking all ves\els whereby the pilots were estopped from claiming
added compensation against the vessel owners. Accord-
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ingly, Ewell is estopped to enforce its claim againsl
D&RG for delay and extra work.
No notice of charges for delay was given to D&Ht.;
until Ewell's billing on November 16. (Ex . .J.5-P.) Ir
Ewell intended to charge D&RG for delay, he had a
duty to speak so that D&RG could either minimize the
delay or verify the damages. Not having done so, he ha 1
misled D&RG to its detriment and is estopped in equit)
to claim damages for delay. Brixey v. Union Oil Co111pany of California, 283 F.Supp. 353 (D. Ark 1968) at
p. 364. Baker v. Maytag, 207 So.2d, 330 (Fla. 19G8).
Ewell blames the alleged November 9 <lelay on ,
D&RG's indecision as to whether to tunnel under or open
cut through its tracks at 540 \Vest 9th South. ( R-5lt
u46.) D&RG claims that Ewell's trench was 80 feet west
of the D&RG main freight track at the close of work 011
November 8; and that he spent November 9, digging up
to 20 feet west of the D&RG track and widening the :
trench into a pit for the jacking crew. (R-724, 728.)
Ewell, contradicting his deposition, stated that it was
the pipe which was still 80 feet away but that the pit and
trench were already dug at the close of November 8.
(R-644-645.) On November 8, however, Ewell had already signed a written contract for jacking. The decision
to jack had, as found by the Court, already been made
by the D&RG and agreed to by Ewell prior to N ovember 9. (R-634, 636.) Accordingly, Ewell is estopped by ,
the very terms of his November 8 contract with D&RG
to charge D&RG for delay on November 9 on the clairo1
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e<l basis that D&RG had not decided whether to jack or
open cut.
It is a well settled principle of law that a person
may estop himself by contract as well as by conduct or any of the other principles applicable
to the doctrine of estoppel. Humble Oil and Re-

fining Co. v. Standard Oil Company

fu<'l-ty), 299 F.Supp. 586 (D. Miss 1946)

(Ken-

POINT VI
THE JUDGlVIENT APPEALED FROM IS
EHHONEOUS BECAUSE EWELL IS
ES TOPPED BY CONTRACT & WAIVER
FHO:\I CLAilVIING COSTS OF JACKING
.\UAINST D&RG OTHER THAN THE FIRST
+o FT.
The only contract between D&RG and Ewell is in
writing, signed and dated November 8, 1965. It provides
for jacking as follows:
WORK TO BE PERFORMED . . . Push,
tunnel or jack a 36 inch diameter 12 gauge corrugated metal pipe per Salt Lake City's specifications for line and depth including pit which
may or may not need sheeted. Length of casing
to be determined by the Railroad's Division Enyineer or his authorized representative. (Ex.
38-P, emphasis added)
On November 11, 1965 around 2:00 p.m. Ewell was
1rally ordered to stop jacking by Kenyon, D&RG Assistant Division Engineer. At this time Ewell demanded
1
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that the railroad put its stop order in writing, whid1 wa 1
done and delivered to Ewell about one hour later. [!
read:
ith reference to sewer line installation crossing
railroad tracks at 9th South near 5th \\Test at Salt
Lake City, Utah.
Please be advised our contract terminates afttr
40 Lin. ft. of casing has been pushed, tunnelled or
jacked into place and centered on the westerh
track. (Ex. 39-P)

Ewell had been instructed by the City, whose agent
he was, that construction at the railroad crossings would
be under the supervision of the railroads. (Ex. u-P, See
also Ex. 3-P.) Before Ewell ever started jacking and at :
least by the time he was ordered to stop, he knew
accura'te configuration of the State Storm Sewer mi1platted by the City Engineer's Office. (R-632-489.)

No, I knew that we weren't coming in at right
angles. That's why I wouldn't sign the contract. :
Had the State Storm Sewer been at a right angle to 9th
South Street as indicated on the City's plan, Ewell could
have stopped jacking at 40 feet and have open cut the
rest of the way to the storm sewer. Although the storm
sewer, being concrete and 48 inches in diameter could
not itself have been open cut, Ewell could have dug
around it from both sides and continued the trench east·
ward. (R-632, 638, 651.) Ewell contends that he needed
!JO feet of casing to get under the three D&RG tracks
without regard to the State Storm Sewer and 100 feet
focluding the storm sewer. (R-629.) But the issue is not
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how much casing was required. The City's plan already
talled for 80 feet under the three D&RG tracks without
reference to the storm sewer. (Ex. 22-P.) The issue is
whether the casing was to be put in by open cut or by
jacking. ( R-635.) As authorized by written contract,
D&RG notified Ewell that he should stop jacking the
at 40 feet, which would be after the casing had
crossed under the first or main freight track, putting it
11nder or at the east edge of the ties of track number two.
IH--18(), 725.) Tracks number two and three (from west
lo east), the latter of which was a discontinued spur,
11 ere to have been open cut. (R-734-736.) Neither was
lo haYe been jacked under at $125.00 per foot. Every
other track crossing 9th South was open cut. The only
011e that Ewell was asked and agreed to jack under was
track number one, the west track at 540 West 9th South.
The reason Ewell jacked under tracks number two and
three was because the State Storm Sewer, placed and
angled as it was, allegedly prohibited Ewell from open
cutting between D&RG track number one and the State
Storm Sewer. It was easier and cheaper to go under all
three tracks and the sewer. The City paid for the East
:30 feet of jacking under the State Storm Sewer. D&RG
has tendered to Ewell $5,000.00 for the first 40 feet of
jacking on the west, under D&RG track number one.
The dispute concerns the middle 30 feet of jacking
which, although passing under D&RG tracks number
two and number three, served no benefit for the railroad.
It was done solely because of the presence of the misplatted State Storm Sewer.
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Payment for the middle 30 feet was expresslv nut
agreed to by D&RG. It ordered Ewell to stop. Ewell
claims that contrary to the terms of an unambiguous
written signed contract and a written stop order, the railroad should be charged for an additional 30 feet of jacking which was caused either by Ewell's failure to innstigate the site, by the City's error in platting, or by the
State in so locating its storm sewer. The only basis upon
which Ewell can claim against D&RG for the middle :30
feet of jacking is quantum meruit. As before noted. no
benefit was thereby unjustly derived by D&RG whieh
would warrant restitution to Ewell. D&RG had no reason to expect to pay for work done contrary to its expres1
<lirection as to a matter under its supervision from whicl1
it received no benefit. Furthermore, a quasi contract
cannot be found in the face of an express contract to the
contrary on the very subject matter. Harding v. Montyornery JfTard Co., 58 NE2d 75 (Ohio 1944) at p. 78.

1

Each of the several claims of Ewell reflects the :
desperation of one who seriously underbid his contract
with the City, either by misplaced confidence in a Com·
missioner who was not privy to any of the negotiations
leading to the contract and/ or by not diligently investi· .
gating the project or discussing the problems with the'
parties affected by the work.
First , Ewell claims breach of an oral contract as lo
the formation of which it is undisputed that the railroads
never agreed to anything.
Secondly, where there was an executed written con·
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trnd between Ewell and D&RG, Ewell claims he is not

bound by it.

Thirdly, after D&RG gave Ewell a written contract
to jack, Ewell claims D&RG had not decided to jack and
so secretly charged D&RG for delay.
The failure of communication and rampant misunderstanding in this case are ample justification for the
established and strict contract procedures characteristic
of railroads and municipalities, the object of which is not
to guard against the dishonesty of parties but
::g;1 inst the misunderstanding and mistakes of honest
lllcn. See Ifill v. Dodge, ll7 A.728 (NH 1922).
POINT VII
THE JUDG.MENT APPEALED FRO:M IS
ERRONEOUS
BECAUSE
JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT :MATTER IS VESTED
EXCLUSIVELY IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION
Railroad tracks in City streets require local franl'hises with the exception of tracks crossing streets at
right :mgles, §56-1-8 UCA 1953. See also Salt Lake City
Ordinances, §35-1-8. All D&RG tracks in the case at bar
eross 9th South Street at or near a right angle.
The commission shall have the exclusive power to
determine and prescribe the manner, including
. . . the terms of . . . maintenance . . . of each
crossing ... of a street by a railroad, §54-4-15,
UC.A 1953. (Emphasis added.)
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Interference between utilities is especially within the
prerogative of the Commission, §54-4-25.
Lack of jurisdiction in the District Court to hear
and determine the present controversy cannot be waired
and was raised and thoroughly argued below. As held bv
this Court in Provo City v. Department of Businc.;1
Re,gulation, 218 P.2d 675, 118 U.l ( 1950) :
We therefore reaffirm the holding that the Public Service Commission has jurisdiction of controversies involving street-railroad crossings; that
the commission under §76-4-15, U.C.A., l!J5:l.
supra, must hear and determine this controvern:
and that the rights of the parties must be dete·r·
mined before that body. (Emphasis added.)

POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJLT.,
DICIAL ERROR BY ADMITTING SELF
SERVING & PAROL EVIDENCE

1

Ewell agreed that he did no work on the project
other than specified in his October 27 contract with the
City. (R-581.) As before noted, the City required that
the crossings be made under railroad supervision with
dispatch and clearly designated the terms of full com· :
pensation for the entire project. (Ex. 6-P, 1-P.) The ad·
mission, over objection, of evidence of an oral agreement
whereby the railroads were to pay extra incentives tr
Ewell, constituted reversible error on the grounds ol I
parol evidence. (R-913, 356, 423, 466.) Ewell's contract
with the City was made after considerable correspond·
1

•

'
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I

cnce between the City and the railroads and after a
meeting involving all parties. The contract gave certain
guarantees and protections to the railroads. Any evideuce of extraneous prior agreements to require the railroads to compensate Ewell for those same benefits is
p:irol evi<lence. The rule prohibiting the admissibility of
parol evidence may be invoked by parties not privy to a
eo11trad but whose rights depend upon it.

It is too well established for citation that, if a
written instrument contains no obvious or latent
ambiguities, neither the parties nor their privies
may testify to what the party means but failed to
state. Although it is sometimes broadly observed
that the parol evidence rule has no application to
any except the pa1·ties to the instrument, ... it is
dear that in the case of a fully integrated agreement, where parol evidence is offered to vary its
terms, the rule operates to protect all whose
rights depend upon the instrument even though
they were not parties to it.

Oa'ford Commercial Corporation v. Landau, 190
N.E2cl, 230, (N.Y. 1953). See also Loria's Garage, Inc.,
11• Smith, 139 A.2nd 430 (N.J. 1958). Williston agrees:
Thus, it is generally held that since the rights of
third party beneficiaries are dependent on the
contract between promisor and promisee, the
parol evidence rule is properly applicable to actions between the beneficiary and the promisor.
4 "\Villiston on Contracts, §647.
Likewise, the October 27 contract with the City
provided that the "contractor shall not be entitled to any
claim for damages on account of hindrance or delay from
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any cause whatever, ... "
1-P, Contract p. rn.) The
Court permitted Ewell to testify that D&llG had <ltlayed him while deciding whether to open cut or jack ai
a result of which every man and piece of equipment remained idle during the entire day of November !Jth: ln
JV estern Engineers Inc. v. State Road Commission, 4i!i
P.2d 216, 20 U.2d 294 ( 1968), plaintiff consulting engineers agreed that they would make no charges or
claims for damages for delay "of any cause whatsoever.·
\Vhile there may be cases to the contrary, the helter reasoned cases hold that, in the instant case,
the plaintiff's were not entitled to introduce parnl
evidence to indicate that the delay was unreasonable or was not contemplated by the parties at thr '
time the contract was executed.
Contractors are generally able by experience and on-site
pre-bid inspection to aJ!ticipate most types of delay in 1
order to protect their bid. To Ewell, the railroad tracks 1
and signals were clearly visible. Even though he could ,
see that some of the tracks were spur tracks, he still in·
sisted that the ten hour guarantee applied to all tracks.
(R-54<7, 548.) The junction boxes of the State Storm'
Sewer on both sides of 9th South were visible. Everything EweJl was to do was known and agreed to by the 1
parties with the railroads' requirements in mind. The
Court should not have admitted evidence of the October
22 meeting or as to any alleged delays. The evidence wai
self serving to Ewell and prejudicial against the railroads, thereby preventing a fair trial. The railroads' objections in this regard should have been sustained.
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Over objection, the Court admitted Exhibit 15-P, a
Jetter written by Carter, the City Engineer to the D&RG
more than two months after the October 22 meeting
,rhi('h purported to reconstruct the terms of the alleged
oral agreement. ( R-904.) The City Engineer admitted
that he wrote it at the request of Ewell and upon information supplied in part by him. (R-324.) D&RG also
objeeted on the grounds of parol evidence to the introduction into evidence of Ewell's billing dated November 1Ii. 1!)()5 to D&RG purporting to summarize the Oci11ber :U meeting. (Ex. 45-P, R-504-505.) The billing
11as self-serving and had no probative value.
Declarations of a person which are merely narra-

tiYes of past transactions, made after the trans-

action to which it relates has been spontaneously
and involuntarily made, are not admissible in evidence as a part of the res gestae. They are selfserving statements and not admissible as such.
ftf u.ff v. Brainard, 35 NW2d, 597 ( N eh. 1949).

* * * * *

... a party cannot make evidence for himself by
his written communications addressed to the other
party, as to the character of dealing with them, or
the liability of the party to whom they are addressed, in the absence of any reply assenting to
the same. Denson 'l'. Kirkpatrick Drilliny Co.,
144 So.8G (Ala. 1932).

These obvious attempts by Ewell to manufacture his
eridence should have been excluded. Admission of the
letters, complimentary to each other, appeared to give
Ewell's allegations the stamp of sovereign approval, to
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the prejudice of D&RG. See also Clayton v. Oyden
State Bank, 26 P.2d, 545, 82 U.564 ( 1933).
POINT lX
TI-IE TRIAL COURT
J> llKJ LDICIAL ERROR IN ADMITTING EVlDENCJi;
THAT D&RG DID NOT OBJECT TO Tlrn
TERlVIS OF EWELL'S PROPOSAL AND IX
PER1\1IITTING TESTIMONY OF ULTlMATE
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
It is clear from the rendition of the October ii
meeting by the City's witnesses that any understanding
that the railroads had agreed to pay Ewell was based '
upon the railroads' failure to object to amounts di)· ,
cussed. The jury was asked to believe the same thing and
apparently did. First of all, under the evidence in the
case at bar, D&RG had no duty to reject any offer. To
admit evidence over objection, and without any foun<la·
tion giving rise to a duty to speak, that D&RG did not
speak, was grossly prejudicial. (R-918, 360, 366, 427, i
-1<30.)

Secondly, to permit Respondent's witnesses to ex·
press conclusions, again over objection, as to the ulti·
mate legal issue of whether or not there was an agree·
ment among the parties, was totally unwarranted. It be·
ing admitted that neither D&RG nor U.P. was erer
asked to pay Ewell's price and that neither ever agreed
to do so, the legal conclusion, itself inadmissible, by a
third person, that an agreement was reached as to each

66

of Ewell's obtuse proposal could only have been
based upon the railroads' failure to object. (R-919, 367,
Ewell's evidence amounted to asking the jury to
make a legal conclusion based upon a faulty premise.
Such a verdict cannot stand.
It is well settled that even a party cannot testify
lo was was "agreed". 1.'rue Oil Company v. Gibson,
:rn:! P.:Zd 7U5 (Wyo. 1964) at p. 798; Price v. JVrather,
H:3 S\V:Z<l, 348 (Tex 1969); Evinger v. MacDougall,
H:l P.:Zd, 194 (Cal 1938) ; Ackerman v. Channel Comllll'l'l'ial Co., 119 P.1011 (Cal 1921). One's "understand111g" about a matter is not competent evidence and its
admis ..,ion constitutes error. Gonseth v. K & K Oil Com/iitn/f, 43U S\V2d, 18 (Mo 1969) at p. 25; Chastain &
Hloss Real Estate & Ins., Inc. v. Davis, 195 So.2d, 782
(Ala 1967).
POINT X
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY FAILURE TO
SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY UPON
INTERROGATORIES OR SPECIAL VERDICT.

At the close of the case, D&RG's counsel requested
that the case be submitted to the jury upon interrogatories or special verdict, ( R-238-239, Ex. p. 11) . Beeause of Respondent's several claims against each of
three differently situated defendants, it was feared that
the jury would, if presented with the entire case absent
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direction to find as to Ewell's specific daim agai 11 \
each of the defendants, simply a ward Ewell eYery
thing claimed, which it did. The jury chose its foreman, deliberated over the 59 exhibits and 5:? instrw
tions, and returned its verdict in favor of H.espondent,
in all particulars claimed less than two hours after retiring. The jury's arithmetic comported in every instant
to that set out in Instruction No. 26.
The faults of the general verdict were roundly and
ably criticiz;ed in Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co .
167 F.2d 54 (2nd Cir. 1948). Clearly, in a case 11i
simple negligence involving few parties, it should be
preserved at the risk of otherwise creating confusio11
as to each element of a cause of action. In multiparl)
suits involving complicated questions of fact, h(merer.
interrogatories or submission on special verdict ferret
out a failure or refusal by the jury to understand :di
of the issues, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com·
pany v. Brian, 337 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1964). In Skidmore, supra, Judge Frank stated:
In short, the general verdict is valued for what it
does, not for what it is. It serves as the great pro·
cedural opiate, * * * dra\vs the curtain upon hu·
man errors and soothes us with the assurance that
we have attained the unattainable.
Learned Hand concurred:
True, it would often expose the general Yerdict tu
defeat bv showing how irrational had been th1
of the juror's minds. However, like Ill)
brother Frank, I am not among those who appeai
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to esteem the system just because it gives rein to
the passional element of our nature, however inevitably that may enter all our conclusions. I
should like to subject a verdict, as narrowly as
was practical, to a review which should make it in
fad, what we very elaborately pretend that it
should be: a decision based upon law.
;\tcordingly, the Court's denial of D&RG's request for
s11hmission of the case on interrogatory or special verdict
11:1s a judicial abuse of discretion which denied D&RG
a fair trial.

POINT XI
TUE COURT ERRED IN SUBl\II'l''l'ING TO

THE JURY RESPONDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS OI3JECTED TO BY APPELLANT.
Ewell is not entitled to catalogue his claims by way
of a jury instruction. The jury was to ascertain the
validity and accuracy of Ewell's claims from the evidence. One of the issues for the jury is whether Ewell
proved his claims by the evidence. It is not for the Court
at the close of the case to instruct on the claims of the
parties. The Court is to instruct the jury on the law.
Therefore, giving instruction number 26, not being an
on the law, but merely a recital of Ewell's
claims for the convenience of the jury in rendering
general verdicts, was prejudicial to D&RG whose exeeption thereto should have been sustained. (Exception
pp. 8-9).

69

lnstructions 28 and ::W purporting to gi \·e the [a 1,
on apparent authority \Vere erroneous as noted. (E1
ceptions p. 9) . Of particular significance is the total
lack of evidence to support any instruction 011 ap_partrn
authority. Ewell's case is a cumulation of negatirb
No one denied authority to contract. No one 0Ljecte1I
to Ewell's proposal. Ewell made a "guarantee'' and 11,
one objected. D&RG cannot be bound to Ewell's strang1
contract just by being there.
Instruction number 31 is completely irrelerani
There was no evidence of any such obligation a'i i1
therein referred to, except the self serving opinion ui
Homer Holmgren. In any event, since D&RG rernorn!
and replaced its tracks as an accommodation to the City.
the instruction serves no purpose. It is apparently intended to have the jury make the conclusion that an)
incidental cost claimed by Ewell with reference to tht
open cut crossings, should be borne by D&RG. (Exceptions p. 9) .
As to instruction number 32, there was no evidence
of bad faith on the part of D&RG in terminating the
November 8 contract. The contract was terminated
as therein provided. D&RG's motive for terminating
the contract is immaterial and does not constitute baa
faith. (Exceptions p 10).
Instruction number 33 again attempts to tie Ewell\
claim for extras to the City franchise agreements. There
was no evidence of any franchise agreement wit\i
D&RG. (Right angle crossings are not subject to fran·
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chise grants by the City in any event) . There was no
evidence that D&RG established any time requirement.
The ten hour figure was suggested by Ewell in response
to a query by U.P. There was no evidence as to why,
in figuring the cost of the work, the contractor would
he entitled to assume that additional costs should have
!wen borne by D&RG rather than the City .At the time
of bid, Ewe11 had never talked with the D&RG but
1ras relying on an old acquaintance, Commissioner Catmull, for assurances permitting a winning bid. D&RG
was told, however, that the contractor would be in-;tructe<l to cross with dispatch under railroad super' is ion. Furthermore, Ewell figured the cost of the job
before the October 22 meeting where the time requirements were allegedly raised. So his low bid should not
have been based on the anticipation of extra costs. (Exceptions p. 10).
Upon the evidence and law heretofore discussed,
giving intsruction number 34 was error. (Exceptions
p. 10).
As to instruction number 35, the law does not infer
that one who permits another to perform services for
him promises to pay for such services. The Court has
confused the principles of implied-in-fact and impliedin-law contract. The words "implied contract" are used
in several instructions without clarification. The test
is not, as the Court instructed, whether a person in
plaintiff's position thinks himself entitled to payment.
Such a unilateral subjective test as to the formation
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of any contract, express or implied-in-fact would 11orh
disaster. If the Court means implied-in-law contraet,
more is required than a disappointed plaintiff.
Giving instruction number ou was error Lecauit
silence is never assent in the absence of a duty to speak.
No circumstance giving rise to such a duty is present
in the evidence. This instruction, in addition to tlir
Court's admission of evidence as to D&RG's failure ti.
object to Ewell's alleged terms, prejudiced the jury.
The jury was encouraged to find an agreement, if sati1
fied that Ewell thought there were one. The eYide1m
is undisputed, however, that D&RG and U.P. l'ad1
believed there was no agreement of any kind. The hi1i
is that subjective intent is not controlling, and it i1
undisputed that there was no manifest assent. For tht
same reasons, instruction 37 is erroneous. Implied-infact bilateral contracts require actual mutual assent
just as do express contracts. Subjective intent is in·
sufficient absent manifest assent. The jury was again
told that if Ewell thought there were an agreement.
then one is implied in order to bind the railroads because
they did not object. Such is not the law, although it
is the whole theory of Ewell's case. (Exceptions p. 11).

CONCLUSION
Ewell claims against D&RG extra payment to d11
work already obligated under his contract with the
City. The sole basis for the claim is that Ewell pro·
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posed to lay sewer pipe casing per 22 feet of open cut
crossing in ten hours. Although instructed by the City
lo make the crossings as fast as possible, Ewell wanted
ten hours per 22 feet for security. So, he charged the
railroads $7 52.62 for each crossing from which their
tracks had already been removed at their expense .
..:\mong all the tracks, D&RG needed only one main
line. One D&RG track was a discontinued spur.
The unlikelihood of such an agreement is exceeded
only by the bizarre manner of its alleged formation:
persons without authority making an oral promise for
ilw expenditure of railroad funds with neither requi)ition nor approval, and doing so not by assent, but by
,i]ence. Laying his 25 years experience aside, and with
a good wish from Commissioner Catmull, Ewell formed
:1 subjective intent that the D&RG was bound, not only
to pay for the City's work, but for any delays or inconreniences with which Ewell might imagine himself
afflicted during the course thereof. After the delays
had passed unannounced, a bill in satisfaction was
rendered to D&RG.
But when faced with a written, executed and dated
contract signed by an
agent for the expenditure of railroad funds properly requisitioned and
approved, Ewell claims he is not bound. Instead, he
daims that D&RG must indemnify him for the City's
negligence in misplatting a State storm sewer and
for his own in failing to see it. This case, having been
tried through the looking glass of distorted law and in73

admissible evidence, was wrongly decided and shoula;
be reversed.
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